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ABSTRACT 
 
Analyzing Risk and Uncertainty for Improving Water Distribution System Security from 
Malevolent Water Supply Contamination Events. (May 2008) 
Jacob Manuel Torres, B.S., Texas A&M University 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Kelly Brumbelow 
           Dr. Seth D. Guikema 
 
 Previous efforts to apply risk analysis for water distribution systems (WDS) have 
not typically included explicit hydraulic simulations in their methodologies.  A risk 
classification scheme is here employed for identifying vulnerable WDS components 
subject to an intentional water contamination event.  A Monte Carlo simulation is 
conducted including uncertain stochastic diurnal demand patterns, seasonal demand, 
initial storage tank levels, time of day of contamination initiation, duration of 
contamination event, and contaminant quantity.   
An investigation is conducted on exposure sensitivities to the stochastic inputs 
and on mitigation measures for contaminant exposure reduction.  Mitigation measures 
include topological modifications to the existing pipe network, valve installation, and an 
emergency purging system.  Findings show that reasonable uncertainties in model inputs 
produce high variability in exposure levels.  It is also shown that exposure level 
distributions experience noticeable sensitivities to population clusters within the 
contaminant spread area.  The significant uncertainty in exposure patterns leads to 
greater resources needed for more effective mitigation.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Modern society is fortunate that successful contamination of water distribution 
systems is a rare event.  However, the historical records on such accidents are too small 
for conventional statistical methods to produce reliable results for risk assessment.  
Therefore, probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) techniques are critical in estimating the 
frequencies of accidents in complex systems [1].  Water distribution systems are one of 
eight critical infrastructures defined in the report by the President’s Commission on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection [2].  However, because water distribution system data 
for real cities contains sensitive information, it is necessary and understandable for it to 
remain confidential.  Unfortunately, this poses a constraint on the research community, 
as results and methods cannot be shared and publicized.  The procurement of water 
distribution data alone can prove to be quite arduous.  Therefore, the development of a 
virtual city can be necessary for reasonable representations of key characteristics for 
actual cities.  These characteristics include: timeline patterns of development, 
demographics, and municipal economics.  One virtual city can serve as a “hub” for 
several multidisciplinary models based on virtual city data.  The addition of larger cities 
will assist in forming a “library” of virtual cities for public domain usage and 
comparative development. 
The need for reliable threat assessments for water supply infrastructures 
potentially subject to malevolent attacks has grown in the water distribution system  
____________ 
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(WDS) research community following 9/11.  Therefore, the examination of smaller-scale 
systems is necessary for gaining a basic understanding on such national issues [3].  To 
address this need, Micropolis, a virtual city representing 5,000 residents has been 
developed.  The key characteristics of Micropolis are contained within a geographic 
information system (GIS) framework.  For the current research application, a few 
characteristics of interest include: pipe sizes, pipe lengths, pipe material, water demands, 
demand patterns, building populations, building types, and storage tank levels.  In the 
present thesis, a vulnerability assessment is performed for a WDS in the event of a water 
supply contamination attack on Micropolis.  A Monte Carlo simulation is then conducted 
and analyzed to examine uncertainties within critical WDS inputs.  It is shown that an 
understanding of hydraulic uniqueness of water distribution systems is important for 
building robust risk models, performing vulnerability assessments, and developing 
emergency response programs.  Knowing what direction water flows through pipes and 
how much water is used at any given time is vital for gaining reasonable estimates on 
contamination exposures. 
 Methods for improving mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery from 
WDS contamination events are further discussed.  These include generalized 
vulnerability assessments, cost-effective mitigation measures, well coordinated 
preparation policies that involve all major emergency service groups, and the use of 
existing communication technologies for developing an efficient response plan.  The 
importance of supplementing water supply contamination emergency planning with 
extended period simulation models is also discussed. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 This section reviews only a portion of the diverse selection of literature available 
to the water distribution system community.  The referenced literature in this section 
entails water distributions system security issues and suggested performance metrics.  
Background for Micropolis, the virtual city research application test bed, is also 
reviewed. 
 
2.1. Vulnerability Assessments for Water Distribution Systems 
 
The infrastructure risk analysis model (IRAM) [4] was developed for small 
community water supply and treatment systems in the United States.  Its approach 
follows a holistic method for the modeling of a water infrastructure system’s 
interconnectedness.  This involves developing a detailed decomposition of a WDS, 
followed by a vulnerability analysis, whereby specific WDS components are assigned 
“access” and “exposure” factors.  “Access” can be interpreted as any physical barrier, 
such as a fenced area or locked gate that hinders unwanted intrusion.  “Exposure” can be 
a measure of public visibility or symbolic value.  For example, a high-rise building 
located downtown has higher exposure and symbolic value than a single-family 
residential home located on the outskirts of town.  The total vulnerability is then taken as 
the product of access and exposure [5] using the equation: 
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(2.1) 
 
where V =system vulnerability; iα =access factor of node i ranging from 0 (zero 
accessibility) to 1 (high accessibility); iγ =exposure factor of node i ranging from 0 (zero 
exposure) to 1 (high exposure).  This approach of conducting a vulnerability analysis to 
identify risks can be viewed as a risk classification scheme rather than a probabilistic 
risk analysis.  This helps to provide the basis for prioritizing critical WDS components 
within the Micropolis virtual city.   
Apostolakis and Lemon [3] recognize that society cannot afford the costs 
associated with absolute protection.  They model infrastructures as interconnected 
digraphs and employ graph theory to help identify the candidate vulnerable scenarios.  
These scenarios are screened for susceptibility based on access controls, and then 
prioritized using multiattribute utility theory. 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) lists current practices for self- 
assessment of small water systems [6].  They include: 
• Inventory of small water system critical components. 
• General questions about the whole system such as the existence of an emergency 
response plan, access to critical components, external lighting, patrol, warning 
signs, and operation and management.  Action plans are required for defective 
areas. 
( )∑
=
=
n
i
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1
*γα
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• General questions about water sources, treatment plants, distribution, personnel, 
information, storage, computers, controls, maps, and public relations.  Action 
plans are required for defective areas. 
• Prioritization of needed actions. 
• Emergency contact lists. 
• Threat identification checklists. 
• Certification of assessment completion. 
Grigg [7] adds to this approach by suggesting a comprehensive program to 
develop water system security indicators.  The measurement of security indicators, 
threat, vulnerability, and consequence, are applied to the lowest system levels (such as a 
water main) which then become aggregated [7].  Though not all of these indicators can 
be quantified, they can be conceptualized using systems theory.  This at least helps to 
outline the problem so that the focus can be set on areas in need of security 
improvement. 
Bristow and Brumbelow [8] construct probability distributions to measure the 
time delay between sensing and response in water contamination events.  They structure 
the delay between sensing and response into five distinct phases.  These include: 
warning transmission, contamination verification, drafting of warning message, warning 
broadcast, and warning compliance.  The entire response process is modeled using a 
Monte Carlo approach to determine probability distributions for response delays.  This is 
supplemented by the use of thirteen case studies in which actual cities had clearly 
documented event timelines for “contaminant verification” and “drafting of warning 
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message” delays.    These timelines provide the justification for the simulation time used 
for the contamination event modeled in the present thesis.   
 
2.2. A Brief History of Micropolis 
 
Micropolis is the first entry into a soon to be “library” of virtual cities.  It 
currently exists in both GIS and EPANet frameworks as shown in Fig. 2.1.  A GIS 
allows layers of spatial data to overlay onto a map for the viewing of spatial 
relationships among various layers of data.  This environment was used to create the city 
of Micropolis.  EPANet was used to model the Micropolis WDS.  It is a hydraulic and 
water quality modeling program developed by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency [9].  It allows for a time series simulation of water distribution systems 
including water quality parameters.  Pipe leak detection, water supply contamination, 
and fire spread models have already been developed for Micropolis, while 
telecommunication and power distribution system models are currently in progress.  
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 Fig. 2.1. Micropolis in (a) GIS and (b) EPANet frameworks. 
 
A selection of the primary physical and operational characteristics of Micropolis 
include a comprehensive building map, designated property lots, residential, 
commercial, and industrial zones, pipe and road networks, one elevated storage tank, one 
water treatment plant, one wastewater treatment plant, diurnal water demand patterns for 
each user, pump operation schedules, an elevation grid, and an electric power 
distribution system.  The city’s main source of water arrives from groundwater wells and 
a surface reservoir located to the north.  
 Micropolis was developed using a historical development timeline to incorporate 
as many attributes of a true city as possible.  For example, it was assumed that 
Micropolis was first settled in the 1850s, and continued to expand with time.  One key 
reason for applying a timeline pattern of development was for the incorporation of 
various pipe material used throughout time.  During the early 1900s most pipes were of 
cast iron material.  Micropolis reflects this circumstance in its oldest area, the 
commercial zone.  Pipes installed in the 1950s were mainly of asbestos cement, and 
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pipes installed in the 1980s were of ductile iron.  These pipes are included in the 
commercial and industrial zones.  Micropolis also incorporates the idiosyncrasies of pipe 
material topology resulting from irregular replacement.  For example, a break in an old 
pipe is replaced with the dominant pipe material at time of replacement.  Variations in 
pipe material reflect variations in pipe roughness factors.  This plays an important role in 
hydraulic behavior and how a WDS functions. 
 
2.3. Water Security and Emergency Response 
 
Executive Order 13010 [10] and Presidential Decision Directive [2] identified 
water supply systems as one of eight critical infrastructures and established the need for 
its increased protection.  Though the probability of carrying out successful 
contamination events on U.S. water supplies is small, the possibility remains real.  
Previous attacks and attempted attacks on U.S. water supplies have proven this fact, as 
shown in Table 2.1 [11].  This account is in addition to a large number of deliberate acts 
of simple pranks and vandalism that go unrecorded by utilities because of fear of 
encouraging copycat events or public overreaction [12].   
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Table 2.1. Previous water supply attacks and attempted attacks [11]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Though much literature on mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery is 
devoted to natural disasters, there has been an increased amount on water distribution 
system contamination events within the current decade.  The American Water Works 
Association (AWWA), the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), and the Water 
Environment Federation (WEF) have recently drafted a joint standard for trial use on 
guidelines for improving the physical security for facilities used in potable water source, 
treatment, and distribution systems [13].   
 
 
 
Year Assailant(s) Event Agent
1984 religious cult Contaminated municipal drinking
water storage tank in Oregon.
salmonella
2001 Bin Laden operative Possible plot to contaminate water supplies in 
twenty-eight cities.  Plan later determined not 
to be credible.
__
2002 Moroccans Developed plot to contaminate water pipes 
leading to U.S. Embassy in Rome
cyanide
2002 Al Qaeda Arrested U.S. residents with documents on 
how to contaminate water supplies.
__
2003 Iraqi operatives Poisoned U.S. food & water supplies. botulinum toxin
N/A religious cult Acquired drums of cyanide to dump cyanide
into Minneapolis reservoirs.
cyanide
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
This section develops the model for assessing risks due to an intentional arsenic 
contamination event.  Arsenic trioxide has been selected as the case study because of its 
ready accessibility and potential to frighten the public.  Arsenic already poses a threat to 
certain U.S. cities that rely on groundwater sources; therefore many citizens know 
enough to perceive arsenic in drinking water as harmful.   This knowledge gives the 
intruder a basis for using arsenic as their contaminant of choice, knowing very well the 
fear that would result upon public notification. 
Risk classification and uncertainty propagation techniques are here applied for 
identifying WDS vulnerabilities and for quantifying the probability density functions for 
population exposures above the maximum contaminant level (MCL).  A base-case 
contamination simulation is presented with investigations on arsenic exposure levels and 
proposed mitigation strategies.  This methodology has been divided into five distinct 
phases as shown in Fig. 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.1. Methodology. 
 
Phase I entails the classification of WDS risks for all water users and prioritizing 
each user’s vulnerability to contamination based on the access and exposure factors 
Identify 
Risks
Simulate 
Base-Case
Quantify 
Uncertainties
Evaluate MCL 
Exposure
Propose 
Mitigation 
Measures
Phase I Phase II Phase IVPhase III Phase V
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previously mentioned.  Phase II begins with analyzing the highest ranked vulnerability 
within the WDS obtained from Phase I and establishes a base-case contamination 
scenario.  This includes a time series simulation using EPANet for monitoring the spatial 
extent to which the contaminant spreads.  This is important for gaining a basic 
understanding on how the hydraulic behavior of the WDS affects contamination 
exposure.  Phase III applies uncertainty propagation techniques for quantifying the MCL 
exposure uncertainties in the model output, given the assessed uncertainties in the model 
inputs.  Phase IV conducts an additional evaluation on variability contained in the results 
from Phase III.  Finally, Phase V proposes and reviews outcomes for several mitigation 
strategies. 
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4. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
For the present thesis, a WDS decomposition was performed as in Ezell et al. [5] 
using hierarchical holographic modeling (HHM) [14].  Fig. 4.1 presents the 
decomposition as it applies to Micropolis using HHM.  This decomposition was needed 
only to help structure the critical components within the Micropolis WDS.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.1. HHM of Micropolis WDS (method adapted from Ezell [5]). 
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4.1.  Phase I – Risk Classification 
 
The underlying basis for the method used in the risk classification scheme 
revolves around three axioms based on Ezell et al [5].  The first axiom states that the 
primary goal of the intruder is to harm as many people as possible by way of water 
contamination.  The second axiom states that contamination vulnerability is proportional 
to contamination risk.  To support this claim, risk of an adversary attack can be taken as 
the product of consequence, threat, and vulnerability as shown in Equation (4.1) [15]: 
 
(4.1) 
 
where R  = risk; C = consequences measured by loss of life, economic impact, loss of 
public confidence, or other metrics; T  = threats characterized by their mean and 
likelihood of occurrence and their potential to disrupt systems; and V  = vulnerability to 
the threat that would cause degradation or system failure.  Therefore, within reason, it 
can be concluded that the more vulnerable a resource is to a disaster, the more at risk 
that resource is to attack by an adversary.  The third axiom follows that system 
vulnerability is a function of component access and exposure [5].  These axioms provide 
the basis for ranking WDS risks in Micropolis that are subject to a contamination event.   
Determination of access and exposure factors for assessing vulnerability was 
done using a GIS in which 700 demand nodes and critical WDS components were 
assigned access and exposure factors based on expert judgment, while maintaining the 
VTCR **=
 14
first axiom.  By applying Equation (2.1), vulnerability scores were computed for each 
user node and other critical WDS components such as the water treatment plant, storage 
tank, and pump station.  These scores were then used to generate a Vulnerability Surface 
Map as shown in Fig. 4.2.  This figure serves as a “spatial tool” for identifying the range 
of vulnerabilities to a contamination event within the Micropolis WDS.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.2. Vulnerability surface map. 
 
All nodes contained in the solid box represent commercial users, while all nodes 
contained in the hatched box represent industrial users.  The remaining nodes represent 
residential users, with a few representing schools, shops, and churches.  As shown in 
Fig. 4.2, the vulnerability ranges from 0.02 to 0.72.  When considering risk in terms of 
access and exposure, the western and eastern portions of Micropolis share similar 
exposure factors.  However, they differ in terms of access.  Micropolis was developed in 
such a way that the western portion is considered to be the more recent development 
with more robust home security features than the east.  Based on the Vulnerability 
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Surface Map, nodes near the outer edges of the city limits are less vulnerable due to 
lower exposure levels.  As one nears the town center (commercial zone), exposure 
increases, therefore this area experiences higher vulnerability.  The town center is also 
much older, as it was developed during the early phases of Micropolis’s “history.”  The 
northeastern portion of the city is also an older residential area, and is poorly maintained; 
therefore access scores are significantly higher in this area.  In all areas, security systems 
for homes and facilities (including the water tower) are assumed to be no more complex 
than simple door and gate locking mechanisms, as is typical for small U.S. towns. 
According to the Vulnerability Surface Map, the node identified as the one 
having the highest vulnerability is the node in the center of town contained within the 
oval.  It was rated with an access and exposure factor of 0.8 and 0.9, respectively.  This 
yields a component vulnerability score of 0.72.  This node represents the city’s elevated 
storage tank (water tower).  The highly exposed storage tank not only lacks reliable 
security, but also satisfies the three axioms, making it a prime target for initiating an 
intentional contamination event.   
Upon identification of the most vulnerable WDS component susceptible to 
contamination, it is useful to model a base-case contamination event using the water 
tower as the prime intrusion point.  To begin, a functional block diagram (FBD) is drawn 
to encapsulate the contamination event process.  A FBD for a successful contamination 
event can become quite complex due to the large scale of interconnectedness for typical 
WDS mechanical functions.  Therefore a simplified FBD for a WDS contamination 
event can be developed that would only account for physical systems in terms of 
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detection and security, and policies such as response and recovery.  Fig. 4.3 illustrates 
this FBD for a successful contamination event 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.3. Functional block diagram. 
 
Note that this FBD is in terms of a series of mitigating systems that would need 
to fail in order for potentially harmful exposures to occur.  This is slightly different from 
conventional FBDs that are usually expressed in terms of mechanical functions, such as 
pipes, generators, pumps, etc.  The “detection system” can represent the existence of a 
supervisory, control, and data acquisition (SCADA) system and/or real-time chemical 
tracking sensors.  In a small town like Micropolis, the cost of such a detection system 
might be prohibitively high.  “Physical security” can represent surveillance systems, wall 
barriers, barbed wire fences, locks, and alarms.  As stated earlier, the water tower is 
assumed to be guarded by nothing more than a locked gate.  “Response action” can 
represent the methods used by a city, such as valve closures, for reducing further spread.  
“Recovery plan” can include not only recovery policies to purge the system of 
contaminants and restore order, but the abilities of water users to regain trust as a result 
of their exposure to WDS disruption. 
Fig. 4.4 presents the fault tree assuming independence and no external events.  
The Boolean polynomial, DCBAT +++= , is obtained.  This fault tree simply 
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confirms the series behavior in that all mitigating systems must function to prevent a 
successful contamination event.  Upon reaching this conclusion, the methodology is 
resumed to simulate a base-case contamination event using the water tower as the prime 
intrusion point.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.4. Fault tree. 
 
4.2.  Phase II – Simulation of a Base-Case Contamination Event 
  
To aid in understanding the hydraulic model simulations, a brief discussion of 
pressure conduit fluid mechanics is useful.  In pressure conduit fluid mechanics there are 
two important governing equations.  The conservation of mass (or continuity) equation 
states that mass or fluid must be conserved as the net sum of inflows and outflows at a 
point.  The energy equation provides the basis for estimating energy change along a 
flowpath.  For any given point, energy (usually called “head” in civil engineering 
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applications) exists in three forms.  These forms include, potential energy (or elevation 
head) indicated as 1Z  in Fig. 4.5, pressure head indicated as γ1P , and kinetic energy (or 
velocity head) indicated as gV 221 .   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.5. Energy equation for pipeline flow [16]. 
 
The “P” in Fig. 4.5 represents a pump.  A pump is used to add energy to the flow.  HGL 
and EGL represent the hydraulic grade line and energy grade line, respectively.  The 
headloss (energy loss) is equal to the slope of the energy grade line.  As fluid flows from 
high head to low head, energy is lost due to friction in pipe walls, pipe bends, pipe 
 
P
EGL
HGL
EGL
HGL
Z1
P1/γ
V12/2g
Z2
P2/γ
V22/2g
Datum
 19
entrance geometry, pipe exit geometry, valves, etc.  The energy equation between two 
points along a pipe can be expressed as:  
 
    (4.2) 
 
where LH  = headloss and pE = energy added by the pump.  A water distribution system 
can be described with a system of continuity and energy equations, which can be solved 
for flows in its pipes and pressures at its nodes.  The EPANet software determines this 
solution using the “gradient” algorithm [17].  Understanding that headloss, elevation, 
pressure, and velocity gradients are responsible for pressurized conduit fluid flow 
behavior is important because the physics of fluid flow in pipes partially governs 
population exposures to contamination.  Risk models that do not account for temporal 
and spatial patterns in flow do not provide detailed, accurate estimates of population 
exposures. 
Before running the simulation for a base-case contamination event, a 
contamination scenario is first established.  As stated previously, the specific 
contaminant to be modeled is arsenic trioxide, As2O3.  It should be noted that pure 
arsenic is not water soluble, although many arsenic compounds may be slightly soluble.  
This thesis focuses on arsenic exposure for users who receive arsenic concentrations 
greater than the MCL of 0.01 mg/L [18].  The MCL is the highest level of a contaminant 
that is allowed in drinking water, set by the EPA with authority granted to them by the 
Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974.  The MCL threshold for arsenic is very low, and in 
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most cases, probably would not have significant health consequences, unless chronic 
exposure is considered (which it is not).  Arsenic levels greater than the MCL already 
exist in human urine, blood, hair, finger nails, and toe nails [19].  However, what this 
thesis attempts to quantify is contamination vulnerability and capability.  There is still 
reason to believe that arsenic levels equal to or exceeding the MCL threshold would 
result in mass fear and loss of public confidence in the water supply infrastructure once 
news of this became public.  The number of people exposed above the arsenic MCL is 
measured in order to illustrate the methodology and usefulness of virtual cities, but other 
thresholds may be adopted as appropriate for particular problems. 
Decay of arsenic trioxide is approximated as a first-order reaction: 
 
    (4.3) 
 
where C = concentration of the reactant at any time t, oC  = initial concentration of 
reactant, k−  = rate constant indicating decay, t  = time elapsed.  The first-order 
approximation is justified with the assumption that existing chlorine residuals within the 
pipe network are much higher and more widespread than the arsenic concentrations 
being inserted.  It is assumed that the arsenic inserted into the system would not react 
with chlorine in such a way that would cause significant drops in chlorine concentrations 
for the entire WDS.  Therefore, there are no significant changes in chlorine 
concentration levels as a result of its reaction to arsenic.  If this is not the case, it would 
be necessary to model arsenic as a second-order reaction decay.   
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All contamination events are simulated for a 72-hour duration.  This duration is 
meant to reflect total response time for a city such as Micropolis.  It is assumed that at 
this time the contamination event would be realized and efforts would be made by the 
city to isolate the contaminant by way of valve closures and other methods for isolating 
the spread.  It is also assumed at this time that public notification would be made 
concerning the event and further consumption of tainted water would cease.  This 72-
hour period was inspired by Bristow and Brumbelow [9], wherein thirteen case studies 
clearly documented response timelines for actual water contamination events. 
The base-case contamination scenario consists of 45 kg (≈ 100 lbs) of arsenic 
inserted at the tank, beginning at 12:00 a.m., with an initial storage tank level of 33.5 
meters (110 ft).  The time of event occurrence is within the September through May time 
frame.  This time frame indicates that water demands for all schools will be considered.  
The hydraulic and water quality simulation of the pipe network is executed using 
EPANet for a total duration of 72 hours.  Fig. 4.6 presents maps of contaminant 
concentration in the system at times after insertion for 6 hours, 18 hours, 48 hours, and 
72 hours.  The legend includes the MCL threshold of 0.01 mg/L.  It is clear that many 
users experience exposure levels much greater than this.   
As shown in Fig. 4.6, certain users experience arsenic exposures greater than 0.2 
mg/L and 2.0 mg/L at various times.  Arsenic exposures in drinking water for 
concentrations ranging between 0.17 to 0.8 ppm (0.17 mg/L to 0.8 mg/L) are capable of 
causing Blackfoot disease, which is endemic in certain developing countries [20].  
Arsenic ingestion through water such as this can also have serious health effects on the 
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human cardiovascular system [21].  According to Fennel et al. [22] and Goldsmith et al. 
[23], both acute and chronic arsenic exposure can also cause altered myocardial 
depolarization and cardiac arrhythmias that may lead to heart failure (qtd. in [21]).  For 
the present thesis, only estimates of the number of people exposed above the MCL are 
discussed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.6. Simulation for (a) 6 hours, (b) 18 hours, (c) 48 hours, and (d) 72 hours. 
 
The purpose for modeling a base-case contamination event is to assess the spatial 
extent of the contamination spread.  Fig. 4.6 shows that only users who receive water 
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that has passed through the storage tank receive arsenic exposure.  These residents are 
enclosed in the spread boundary polygon in Fig. 4.6(b).  All other users get their water 
directly from the water treatment plant (WTP).  Conventional wisdom may have led one 
to believe that the spread should have occurred in a concentric fashion.  However, as 
Fig. 4.6 shows, this is not the case.  Taking into account daily demand patterns for each 
user, pump operations, and flow directions play an important role in how the 
contamination spread behaves. 
 
4.3.  Phase III – Quantify Uncertainties 
 
Uncertainty propagation consists of methods for quantifying uncertainties in the 
model output that are induced by the uncertainties in the model inputs [24].  For the 
given virtual water distribution model, it is shown how Monte Carlo simulations can be 
used to gain insights into the magnitudes of uncertainty in population exposures from a 
malevolent water supply contamination attack.   
 
4.3.1.  Uncertainties in Model Inputs 
 
Monte Carlo simulations were used for uncertainty quantification and were 
implemented in a Visual Basic code linked to the EPANet Toolkit for iterative hydraulic 
simulations.  Uncertainties are modeled for six inputs believed to carry the greatest 
impact on contaminant spread behavior.  They include uncertainties in daily demand, 
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initial storage tank levels, seasonal demand, time of initiation for contamination event, 
duration of arsenic intrusion, and quantity of contaminant inserted at the tank.  Three of 
these inputs are modeled as lognormal distributions.  Research shows that lognormal 
distributions are useful for representing non-negative and positively skewed physical 
quantities [24].  The probability distribution for each input is discussed. 
To explain how uncertainties in daily demands are modeled, it is necessary to 
provide a brief discussion of the EPANet interface and how it handles demand 
information.  In EPANet, a “base demand” is set for each user based on zone type 
(residential, commercial, industrial) and population.  This “base demand” represents the 
average amount of water consumed in a 24 hour period.  Because EPANet is capable of 
modeling hourly time increments, hourly (actual) demands can also be defined.  To do 
this, daily demands for a single user are divided into 24 time periods, with each period 
containing a “multiplier” that is specified by the program user.  It is referred to as a 
“multiplier” because EPANet multiplies this factor by the “base demand” to compute the 
actual demand for that hour.  The sequence of multipliers for a 24 hour time period 
forms a daily demand pattern.  The process of setting base demands, multipliers, and 
demand patterns is completed for all user nodes before any modeling takes place.  These 
are considered to be “fixed” multipliers and demand patterns.   
For modeling uncertainty in daily demands, a normal distribution was applied to 
each hourly multiplier value for all users.  That is, each of the 24 multiplier values 
possesses its own distribution.  If the model is to account for uncertainty in hourly 
demands using EPANet, then the uncertainty should lie in the hourly multipliers, not the 
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base demand.  The hourly demand distribution featured in Fig. 4.7 models the demand 
uncertainty for the 1st time period for a commercial restaurant.  It is modeled as a 
Normal (0.2, 0.05) distribution.  With five different patterns (residential, industrial, and 
three forms of commercial) and 24 time periods for each pattern, there are actually 120 
different normal distributions used in the Monte Carlo analysis for accounting for 
stochastic daily demands.  Fig. 4.7 presents only a sample distribution for a single 
multiplier.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.7. Accounting for uncertainty in daily demand. 
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The mean and standard deviation for all demand distributions depend on their 
corresponding “fixed” multipliers.  For a given time period, the fixed multiplier is used 
as the mean for its distribution with its standard deviation taken as 0.25*mean.  This is 
represented in Fig. 4.8.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.8. Relating demand distributions with demand multipliers. 
 
The advantage of applying distributions to each multiplier is that it allows the 
shape of the fixed (original) pattern to be maintained while making slight fluctuations in 
the individual multipliers.  Fig. 4.9 illustrates this notion.  Fig. 4.9(a) is the fixed pattern.  
Figs. 4.9(b), 4.9(c), and 4.9(d) are three realizations of the stochastic pattern that occur 
when a normal distribution is applied to each multiplier.  It can be seen that individual 
multipliers vary, but the overall demand pattern shape for the restaurant is maintained.  
This is important because demand pattern shapes for specific users do not vary greatly.  
For example, the restaurant depicted in Figs. 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 will almost always have 
demand peaks at breakfast, lunch, and dinner hours.   
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Fig. 4.9. Varying demand multipliers while maintaining pattern shape. 
 
The initial level for the storage tank was modeled as a Lognormal (4.693, 0.016) 
distribution.  Taking the exponential transform of the raw data set results in a mean, µ = 
33.27 m (109.15 ft) and standard deviation, σ = 0.54 m (1.77 ft) as shown in Fig. 4.10.  
These values are based on the operational and hydraulic characteristics of the Micropolis 
WDS, which would typically attempt to have a relatively full tank in the early morning 
hours of the day; hence the relatively small standard deviation.  This reasoning is 
demonstrated by a plot in Fig. 4.11 which illustrates tank levels versus time from a 
deterministic simulation showing that the tank levels generally repeat every twenty-four 
hours. 
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Fig. 4.10. Accounting for uncertainty in tank level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.11. Tank level time series. 
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In the case of Micropolis, seasonal demand patterns are driven principally by 
whether or not schools are in session.  For a town such as Micropolis, they are the only 
users whose demands vary significantly within a 12 month period.  It is assumed that 
schools are in session for 9 months of the year, and water use is negligible at the schools 
in the other 3 months.  Applying Fig. 4.12, if a generated uniform random number 
(values of zero to one) is greater than 0.75, then a zero demand is assigned to all schools.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.12. Accounting for uncertainty in seasonal demand.  
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Because it is most likely for the contamination event to take place in early 
morning or late at night, the Beta (0.5, 0.5) is most attractive for determining when the 
contamination event is initiated.  This distribution is shown in Fig. 4.13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.13. Accounting for uncertainty in time for which contamination event is initiated. 
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deviation, σ = 0.642.  Taking the exponential transform of the raw data set results in a µ 
= 2.2 hours and σ = 1.91 hours. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.14. Accounting for uncertainty in duration of contaminant intrusion. 
 
When considering the amount of arsenic inserted at the tank, EPANet allows for 
different hourly quantities for a given “base quantity,” similar to that just mentioned for 
demand patterns.   Therefore, a lognormal distribution was modeled for a base flux of 45 
kg/hr (≈ 100 lbs/hr).  This was a reasonable amount to assume for one adult of medium 
build to carry.  The hourly quantity is then varied according to randomly adjusted 
multipliers for each time period.  The lognormal distribution for these multipliers 
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assumes a mean, µ = -0.168 and a standard deviation, σ = 0.642 as shown in Fig. 4.15.  
Because there is much uncertainty in how much arsenic is actually used, the standard 
deviation was purposely chosen to be quite high.  This distribution implies that the 
arsenic quantity becomes less attractive to the intruder for greater amounts of arsenic 
used.  Greater amounts could require multiple trips, multiple people, and longer time to 
accomplish the task, which would result in a higher probability of being caught. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.15. Accounting for uncertainty in arsenic quantity used by intruder. 
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4.3.2.  Uncertainty Propagation 
 
An overview of uncertainty analysis guidelines for determining sample size 
convergence is provided by Morgan and Henrion [24].  Equation (4.4) was applied for 
determining the sample size for the Monte Carlo simulation based on uncertainty about 
the mean.  
 
       (4.4) 
 
In Equation (4.4), m  = sample size (number of iterations), c  = critical value for 95% 
confidence interval (1.645), σ =standard deviation, and w =desired confidence interval 
width.  For w =30, the necessary sample size was determined to be 13,204 for the 95% 
confidence interval.  It was decided to perform 15,000 iterations.  For 15,000 
replications, the simulation resulted in the histogram and the corresponding probability 
density function shown in Fig. 4.16.  The results prove to be quite significant in terms of 
arsenic exposure exceeding the MCL.  Fig. 4.16(a) and Fig. 4.16(b) show two apparent 
modes.  The first mode corresponds to 4000 people exposed above the MCL, with an 
approximate probability density function (PDF) value of 0.007.  The second mode 
corresponds to 5000 people exposed above the MCL, with an approximate PDF value of 
0.012.  This should be enough to raise concerns for any water provider.  Exposures of 
this magnitude include damage to human health, financial establishments, WDS 
components, fear, and loss of public confidence in water utilities.   
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Fig. 4.16. Monte Carlo results for (a) arsenic exposure histogram and (b) probability 
density function.   
 
 
 
Referring to Fig. 4.16 and recalling that Micropolis is only a 5,000 person city; 
the notion of 5,000 persons being exposed in only a portion of the city (those within the 
spread boundary) may seem questionable.  Fig. 4.16 is based on exposure resulting from 
daily demand.  Therefore, one person may become exposed to arsenic at home, then 
again at work.  This person gets counted twice, because the intruder is essentially 
causing twice the harm.  The next step was to further investigate the reasoning behind 
the bimodal phenomenon of Fig. 4.16 and to evaluate the variability within the Monte 
Carlo results from a time series perspective. 
 
4.4. Phase IV – Further Evaluation of Maximum Contaminant Level Exposures 
 
To help explain the bimodal characteristics of Fig. 4.16, a population density 
map was created using a GIS (Fig. 4.17).  Also indicated on the map is the portion of 
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Micropolis that receives water that has passed through the storage tank.  It was first 
hypothesized that the apartment complex was the reason for the bimodality, as the total 
population for the apartment complex is 640, with a total base demand of 663 L/min 
(175 gpm).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.17. Population density map. 
 
To determine whether the apartment complex was indeed the cause, population 
values for the apartment complex were temporarily set to zero in the Monte Carlo 
analysis.  This was done rather than assigning zero water demands for the reason that 
doing so would have altered flow directions, and thus contamination spread. The 15,000 
iteration process was repeated.  The result for this new scenario is shown as the broken 
curve in Fig. 4.18.  The distribution remains bimodal, only it has shifted approximately 
640 people to the left from the original distribution.   
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Fig. 4.18. PDF results for arsenic exposure investigation derived from Monte Carlo 
analysis. 
 
 
Further investigation shows that the elementary school at the southwest corner of 
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population accounts for 700 students, faculty, and staff with a base demand of 296 L/min 
(78 gpm).  The 15,000 iteration process was repeated with the population values for the 
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shown as the gray solid curve in Fig. 4.18.  As this figure shows, the bimodality is no 
longer present.  In fact, the resulting distribution lends itself quite well to a normal 
distribution.  The two modes are thus seen to exist for replications with the school in 
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session (right mode) and out of session (left mode).  This observation demonstrates the 
effect that a concentration of users at a single location may have on contaminant 
exposure and how itinerant water usage at this location may lead to bifurcated system 
behavior and expectations of consequences.   
To convey variability in population exposure through the 72 hour simulation 
period, a quartile graph derived from the Monte Carlo results is shown Fig. 4.19.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.19. Time series MCL exposures derived from Monte Carlo analysis. 
 
The curve with square markers represents the mean over 15,000 data points, as do other 
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uncertainties in model inputs produce high variability in exposure levels.  It is also 
shown that exposure rises quickly during the initial stages of the contamination event.  
Understandably, exposure decreases when demand decreases, such as during nighttime.   
In the best case (least exposure) result, approximately 750 people are exposed above the 
MCL around the 32nd hour, which is about one-tenth the total possible.  This level of 
exposure could conceivably incite significant public fear.  The worst case results in 
approximately 7,000 people exposed, which is effectively the full population including 
the “double exposed, double counted” effect. 
An important note learned from this additional evaluation is that when 
performing risk analysis, risk classification, and/or vulnerability assessments, it is 
necessary to understand how the water distribution system of interest is hydraulically 
idiosyncratic.  Only by applying uncertainty propagation techniques and performing 
further investigations was useful knowledge about the hydraulic behavior and 
contamination spread gained. Phase V shows how this additional knowledge helps to 
refine mitigation strategies. 
 
4.5.  Phase V – Mitigation Strategies 
 
Four mitigation strategies are presented in Fig. 4.20.  They include topological 
modifications to the existing pipe network, valve installation, and an emergency purging 
system, and a combination strategy.  The proposed strategies are based on the previously 
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discussed exposure results.  Their effectiveness is illustrated in Fig. 4.21 for a 72 hour 
time series compared to the base-case (no mitigation) scenario.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.20. Mitigation strategies: (a) emergency pipe installation, (b) emergency valve 
installation, (c) contamination sink, and (d) emergency pipe and contamination sink. 
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strategy does not prove to be very effective, as maximum exposure levels are similar to 
the base-case scenario.  This is because added flow from the new line changes flow 
patterns to “push” the contaminant to a different group of users.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.21. Time series arsenic exposure for each mitigation strategy. 
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programmed to close, thereby prohibiting spread to these highly populated areas.  The 
result for this mitigation strategy is presented as the curve with triangle markers in Fig. 
4.21.  This curve shows a slight improvement, but the amount of people exposed above 
the MCL remains high.   
 Mitigation Strategy 3 entails an emergency purging system which utilizes a 
contamination “sink” near the storage tank.  This is labeled and shown as a triangle in 
Fig. 4.20(c).  A contamination sink could represent an empty underground storage tank 
with high capacity for water storage, and located near the water supply tank.  It was 
hypothesized that the sink would draw water with a constant demand of 1124 L/min 
(297 gpm).  This is the highest demand that could be achieved while still maintaining 
fire flow pressures of 138 kPa (20 psi), as required throughout the city.  Real-time sensor 
monitoring near the tank would activate the sink and drain most of the arsenic residual.  
The stored arsenic could then be treated before discharge.  The result for this mitigation 
strategy is presented as the curve with cross markers in Fig. 4.21.  This curve shows a 
significant improvement, but the amount of people exposed above the MCL remains 
high.   
Because the third strategy was limited by the ability to maintain fire flow 
pressures, Mitigation Strategy 4 combines the first and third strategies to form a 
“hybrid” mitigation strategy.  The emergency pipe installation and contamination sink 
are shown in Fig. 4.20(d).  Because water supply is added to eastern Micropolis, the sink 
demand can be increased to a constant 1514 L/min (400 gpm), while maintaining fire 
flows.  Again, real-time sensor monitoring near the tank would activate the sink for the 
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draining of arsenic, while activating the emergency pipe for clean water supply and 
added pressure.  The stored arsenic could then be treated before discharge.  The result 
for this mitigation strategy is presented as the curve with diamond markers in Fig. 4.21.  
This curve shows few people exposed above the MCL, and those who are, experience 
exposure levels near the MCL. 
As shown, the Mitigation Strategy 4 was proven to be the most effective for 
reducing arsenic exposure.  This strategy relies upon a sophisticated control system 
actuated by real-time water quality sensors.  At present, such sensors are under 
development for many potential contaminants and are not widely available.  However, in 
anticipation of their deployment, optimization schemes are currently under development 
for sensor placement [25].  Work has also been performed in the identification of 
efficient threat management strategies through simulation and analysis of contamination 
events for water distribution systems [26].  It has also been suggested that an all hazard 
approach would aid in managing threats to critical infrastructures [27].  This includes 
infrastructure threats due to hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, fires, etc. 
The contamination sink “footprint” is also ill-defined.  The sink is purely 
hypothetical, to be seen mainly as a safeguard with unlimited capacity and high demand.  
However, the installation of safety valves and emergency pipelines can be considered 
reasonable for a small town like Micropolis. 
A less costly alternative would be to hire trustworthy staff to monitor “out of the 
ordinary” radio calls, in the instance that isolation valves need to be closed at moment’s 
notice.  An emergency preparedness plan and communication with city residents would 
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also educate the public on what to do during critical infrastructure failure.  In the case of 
decision making, multiattribute utility theory could be of most importance. This would 
involve developing a utility function(s) that could account for both uncertainties and 
risks for malevolent WDS sabotage.  The decision for which expected utility is 
maximized would be chosen. 
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5. IMPROVING THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROCESS FOR WATER 
SUPPLY CONTAMINATION EVENTS 
 
This section develops the basis for improving existing methods for mitigating, 
preparing for, responding to, and recovering from WDS contamination events.  Fig. 5.1 
illustrates a generalized disaster life cycle for emergency management planning [28]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.1. Emergency management: the disaster life cycle [28].  
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efforts for restoring the WDS back to acceptable levels of operation by restoring water 
quality and rectifying any physical damages.  These preparation measures should be in 
place before a disaster occurs.  Following a recovery, emergency management 
procedures should be re-evaluated and updated to reflect unexpected events in the 
previous disaster, and to reflect changing external conditions.  A water utility should also 
take note that the degrees of WDS vulnerability to contamination events are not 
constant.  Rather, they change as the city’s population and economy redistributes itself 
geographically [29].  Therefore, mitigation measures should not be held constant, but 
should also be continuously re-evaluated and updated as necessary.  Each element within 
the disaster life cycle is discussed in further detail with recommendations for improving 
WDS security.   
 
5.1. Mitigation 
 
 Before a water utility can commence mitigation on a WDS, a detailed 
vulnerability assessment should be conducted in order to identify what areas of the 
system need the most attention.  It would make sense for the vulnerability assessor to 
one with experience and knowledge of the WDS.  Table 5.1 shows a generalized 
process, suggested by AWWA [12], for conducting a vulnerability assessment for a 
water distribution system. 
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Table 5.1. The vulnerability assessment process [12]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 1 calls for water utilities to identify all major system components.  For a 
water distribution system this includes: treatment facilities, pump stations, intake 
locations, storage tanks, control rooms, etc.  Step 2 looks at the major system 
components from Step 1, and raises the question, “How would my system function 
during a contamination event and what might be the effects of such an event?”  Step 3 
establishes performance goals and acceptable levels of service.  In regard to a 
contamination event, this means returning the water quality and pressures to acceptable 
levels of service.  Finally, Step 4 narrows down the identified components from Step 1, 
and asks the question, “Which components are most likely to fail, become breached, or 
become a source point for contamination?”  Step 2 is perhaps the most difficult step.  It 
requires the assessor to predict what areas of the WDS would become exposed to tainted 
water in the event of a contamination attack.  For many water utilities, especially small 
ones, predictions are as good as it gets. Unfortunately, WDSs are not intuitive systems.  
Given the high degree of safety and health at risk, it would be unwise to base mitigation 
Step Activity
1 Identify  major  system  components
2 Determine  effects of  probable  disaster
3 Establish  performance  goals  and  acceptable  levels  of  service
4 Identify  critical  components
 47
programs on simple assumptions of contamination spread behavior.  One solution is to 
adopt a scenario-based modeling approach.  This approach is similar to that discussed in 
Section 4.2., Phase II – Simulation of a Base-Case Contamination Event.  For example, 
following Step 4 of the vulnerability assessment process, the assessor is said to have 
identified the elevated storage tank as a prime target for a contamination attack.  The 
vulnerability assessor wishes to know the probable behavior of contamination spread if 
the tank were to become breached.  At this point, the assessor can refer to the results of 
Phase II – Simulation of a Base-Case Contamination Event such as that shown in Fig. 
4.6.  The assessor could then resume with the proposition and modeling of several 
effective mitigation strategies, such as those mentioned in Section 4.5., Phase V – 
Mitigation Strategies.   
Recall that Mitigation Strategy 4 proved most effective.  However, as this 
strategy entails, words like “real-time water quality sensors”, “1700 ft. pipe 
installations,” and “high demand storage tanks,” it would probably not prove to be as 
attractive to water utilities on limited budgets, therefore mitigation strategies should be 
chosen to be cost effective.  Providing simple education to water utility personnel and 
residents about contamination awareness could be considered an effective mitigation 
measure.  Adding WDS redundancy by adding alternate sources of water supply, such as 
treated water stored offsite could prove beneficial.  The installation of updated locks, 
adequate lighting, multi-barrier fencing, and window security at control rooms could 
also reduce the likelihood of successful attack.  Other adjustments include adding motion 
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detectors, closed-circuit surveillance, and clearing shrubbery and brush around facilities 
that could impair surveillance monitoring.   
 Like viruses, intruders can become immune to existing mitigation measures.  
This can happen when an intruder’s attack strategy or priority evolves in order to counter 
increased security measures.  In addition, as the population and economy re-distributes 
themselves, demand stresses will be added to the water distribution system [29].  To 
meet these changes, mitigation measures require continuous re-evaluation and updating.   
 
5.2. Preparedness 
 
Before a contamination event occurs, a preparation policy should already be in 
place.  Utility personnel and representatives from the community need to be comfortable 
with some type of drill (such as fire drills) or table-top exercises on a regular basis.  
Funding for preparation programs is available from the EPA through grants.  This is 
especially attractive for small towns with limited budgets.  In addition to drills, 
exercises, and funding, coordination with other agencies should also be a priority.  Water 
utilities, fire departments, police departments, emergency medical services (EMS), and 
hospitals are only a few of the organizations that need to be capable of working together 
in an efficient manner during a water supply contamination attack.  In addition to these 
emergency services, consortiums and non-governmental organizations (NGO) should 
also be included in the coordination “loop.”   
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5.3. Response 
 
If a contamination attack to a city’s water distribution system were to occur, 
would that city be prepared to respond?    This is the essential question for this thesis.  
According to the Federal Bioterrorism and Response Act of 2002, they should be.  This 
act required all towns greater than 3,300 to conduct vulnerability assessments of their 
water system and prepare emergency response plans.  However, EPA only requires these 
cities to submit certifications of compliance, and not the actual vulnerability 
assessments.  This sort of process is susceptible to “cutting corners” on vulnerability 
assessments and hazard mitigation plans.   At this point, it would be difficult to ascertain 
the true level of preparedness from the literature and from calling water utilities directly, 
nevertheless efforts are underway to find the best answers possible.  As guidance to 
North American water utilities, AWWA [12] has adopted the generalized emergency 
response process shown in Table 5.2.   
 
Table 5.2. The emergency response process [12]. 
 
 
 
 
 
Step Activity
1 Detect
2 Analyze Severity
3 Isolate
4 Purge
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Referring to Step 1, before it can respond, a water utility should be able to detect 
and verify that a contamination event has occurred.  Detection capability includes, but is 
not limited to, water quality monitoring and the monitoring of health reports at hospitals.  
From the moment of contamination event initiation, to detection, to response, there 
exists a significant delay in time.  This can have a significant impact on the amount of 
lives exposed to contaminated water.  Efforts have been made to model this delay by 
Bristow and Brumbelow [9], as previously discussed in Section 2.1., Vulnerability 
Assessments for Water Distribution Systems.   
Step 2 analyzes the severity of the incident following detection.  A water 
distribution system is too large and complex to analyze at once, therefore, with the help 
of previous vulnerability assessments and hydraulic models, one can eliminate portions 
of the system not likely to experience contaminant exposure.  Step 3 establishes the next 
priority by taking the necessary actions to isolate the contaminant from further spread.  
Field and modeling analysis would help determine which areas to isolate based on the 
contamination spread boundary.  Step 4 involves purging the system of tainted water.  
This could require simple flushing from fire hydrants into storm sewers, or treating the 
water before releasing it back into the environment. 
 It is obvious that a successful emergency response involves clear 
communications.  For example, citizens require rapid alert information for complying 
with warnings about their drinking water.  It is almost shocking, given our current 
“information age,” that utilities still struggle with significant time delays in detecting and 
responding to contamination incidents.   Television, radio, email, text messaging, and 
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sirens (TRETS) are all tools that exhibit great potential for providing maximum rapid 
information to citizens in the event of an intentional, accidental, or natural breach of a 
water distribution system.  The concept with TRETS is that at any given time residents 
are likely to be watching television, listening to the radio, checking email, carrying a 
cellular phone, or outside capable of hearing a siren.  Of these five tools, one to note is 
the technology for text messaging via cellular phones.  Text messaging is still largely 
unused by emergency planners.  Universities are just now beginning to utilize this 
resource as a result of the tragedy at Virginia Tech on April 16, 2007.  Texas A&M 
University has initiated the Code Maroon text messaging system for relaying emergency 
information to students, faculty, and staff.  Another tool of note is the use of sirens.  If a 
siren is properly sounded over an effective range, citizens can translate this into action 
by tuning into the local news network on a television, radio, or by checking text 
messages and email for up-to-date information.  Perry and Lindell [30] have noted, that 
when confronted with a disaster, citizens are capable of making wise decisions, should 
be expected to take action, and should be expected to comply with authority 
recommendations if they are provided with adequate information in a timely manner.   
 Another current technological disadvantage is the lack of availability of real-time 
water quality sensors.  These sensors are currently under development.  They should not 
only be real-time detection sensors, but comprehensive in terms of what they can detect.  
These sensors should be capable of detecting most contaminants, either chemical, 
biological, or radiological.  Bridging the gap between real-time water quality detection 
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and rapid information to citizens would drastically improve current emergency response 
plans. 
 
5.4. Recovery 
 
Recovery efforts should begin immediately, even if the contaminant is still in the 
WDS.  It should begin with the notification of utility personnel, residents, hospitals, 
emergency services, and the media during and after the event.  Recovery also includes 
the provision of immediate medical assistance to those in need.  Field sampling should 
continue in affected areas until the water supply is proven safe, and any physical 
damages to the system as a result of the attack should be repaired as soon as possible. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1. Analytical Conclusions 
 
An investigation was conducted on exposure sensitivities to stochastic inputs and 
on mitigation measures for contaminant exposure reduction.  Findings show that 
reasonable uncertainties in model inputs produce high variability in exposure levels.  It 
is also shown that exposure level distributions experience noticeable sensitivity to 
population clusters within the contaminant spread area, i.e., the school and apartment 
complex.  The significance in uncertainty for exposure patterns demonstrates the need 
for developing more resources to effective mitigation.   
As an additional consideration, all water distribution systems are hydraulically 
unique and behave differently.  If these hydraulic details are not included in risk models, 
important insights will be missed.  This can easily be forgotten when performing 
probabilistic risk analysis, vulnerability assessments, and multiattribute utility theory 
when assessing WDS contamination risk.  If reasonable results are to be obtained, then 
the understanding of basic fluid mechanics is also important.   Knowing what direction 
water flows and how much of it is used at any given time is vital for gaining reasonable 
estimates on contamination exposure.  Only by applying uncertainty propagation 
techniques and performing investigations was useful knowledge on the hydraulic and 
contamination spread behavior gained. 
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As is well known, an important goal for modeling risk and uncertainty for critical 
infrastructures is to provide a tool for those needing to make important decisions 
concerning public welfare.  But for many researchers, this modeling is rather difficult 
considering the sensitive nature of the data being used.  Because real city data is kept 
confidential, the concept of contributing to a library of virtual cities is vital for the 
research community.  Information can be shared and insights gained from comparative 
development.  Micropolis is the first entry into such a library, which is freely available 
for others’ use.  Although Micropolis is a virtual city, the methodologies used and 
insights gained through its modeling process may be adapted for real cities. 
 
6.2. Non-Analytical Conclusions 
 
It is not necessarily safe to assume that because a particular water user is located 
near a water source, this same user receives water from that source, and should therefore 
be accounted for in mitigation planning for a contamination attack of that same water 
source.  If this instinctive behavior is chosen in place of hydraulic and water quality 
modeling of an actual WDS, then selected mitigation strategies can pose a potential for 
making contamination spread and human exposures far worse.  Mitigation selection 
based on instinctive behavior was the basis for developing Mitigation Strategy 1, and as 
the results showed, it did nothing to reduce contamination exposure.  The advantage of 
scenario-based modeling lies not only in the understanding of contamination spread 
behavior, but in proposals for various mitigation strategies.  If one strategy proves 
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ineffective, the modeler has the freedom to choose and re-simulate another.  Having an 
effective mitigation plan can have a ripple effect in the rest of the disaster life cycle by 
increasing the chances of successful preparedness, response, and recovery efforts.  
In addition to vulnerability assessments required by the Bioterrorism Act, a water 
utility should supplement mitigation and response procedures with extended period 
simulation models for the actual water distribution systems.  By adopting a 
contamination event scenario modeling approach, a water utility can gain a better 
understanding of how contamination spreads from a given point.  Therefore, scenario 
modeling and disaster planning should go hand in hand.  Planning for mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery should not be made worse by excessive guessing.  
Simply put, WDSs are too complex for one to assume intuitive development of 
mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery based on “one size fits all” 
assessments.  Every city’s plan will be unique due to their topology, economy, 
demography, etc.  Every city not only has different WDSs, but different styles of policy, 
utility organization structures, and priorities. 
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APPENDIX A 
MONTE CARLO SIMULATION RESULTS 
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Table A.1. Monte Carlo simulation results for number of persons exposed above arsenic 
MCL (0.01 mg/L). 
 
Population Frequency PDF Value Population Frequency PDF Value Population Frequency PDF Value
1000 0 0.00000 1000 0 0.00000 1000 2 0.00013
1020 0 0.00000 1020 1 0.00007 1020 0 0.00000
1040 0 0.00000 1040 0 0.00000 1040 0 0.00000
1060 0 0.00000 1060 0 0.00000 1060 0 0.00000
1080 1 0.00007 1080 0 0.00000 1080 0 0.00000
1100 0 0.00000 1100 0 0.00000 1100 2 0.00013
1120 0 0.00000 1120 1 0.00007 1120 1 0.00007
1140 0 0.00000 1140 0 0.00000 1140 0 0.00000
1160 0 0.00000 1160 2 0.00013 1160 1 0.00007
1180 0 0.00000 1180 0 0.00000 1180 1 0.00007
1200 0 0.00000 1200 2 0.00013 1200 1 0.00007
1220 0 0.00000 1220 0 0.00000 1220 2 0.00013
1240 0 0.00000 1240 1 0.00007 1240 2 0.00013
1260 0 0.00000 1260 0 0.00000 1260 2 0.00013
1280 0 0.00000 1280 0 0.00000 1280 1 0.00007
1300 0 0.00000 1300 0 0.00000 1300 0 0.00000
1320 0 0.00000 1320 1 0.00007 1320 3 0.00020
1340 0 0.00000 1340 2 0.00013 1340 3 0.00020
1360 0 0.00000 1360 3 0.00020 1360 1 0.00007
1380 0 0.00000 1380 3 0.00020 1380 2 0.00013
1400 0 0.00000 1400 0 0.00000 1400 3 0.00020
1420 0 0.00000 1420 0 0.00000 1420 2 0.00013
1440 1 0.00007 1440 5 0.00033 1440 5 0.00033
1460 0 0.00000 1460 4 0.00027 1460 2 0.00013
1480 1 0.00007 1480 5 0.00033 1480 3 0.00020
1500 0 0.00000 1500 2 0.00013 1500 3 0.00020
1520 0 0.00000 1520 6 0.00040 1520 3 0.00020
1540 0 0.00000 1540 3 0.00020 1540 9 0.00060
1560 1 0.00007 1560 6 0.00040 1560 4 0.00027
1580 0 0.00000 1580 3 0.00020 1580 7 0.00047
1600 0 0.00000 1600 7 0.00047 1600 3 0.00020
1620 0 0.00000 1620 1 0.00007 1620 11 0.00073
1640 1 0.00007 1640 8 0.00053 1640 6 0.00040
1660 0 0.00000 1660 10 0.00067 1660 5 0.00033
1680 0 0.00000 1680 4 0.00027 1680 5 0.00033
1700 2 0.00013 1700 8 0.00053 1700 10 0.00067
1720 2 0.00013 1720 7 0.00047 1720 7 0.00047
1740 1 0.00007 1740 9 0.00060 1740 6 0.00040
1760 2 0.00013 1760 1 0.00007 1760 8 0.00053
1780 1 0.00007 1780 7 0.00047 1780 8 0.00053
1800 1 0.00007 1800 6 0.00040 1800 5 0.00033
1820 2 0.00013 1820 10 0.00067 1820 6 0.00040
1840 0 0.00000 1840 6 0.00040 1840 5 0.00033
MC Results, 15,000 iterations
excluding apartment and school
MC Results, 15,000 iterations MC Results, 15,000 iterations
excluding apartment
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Table A.1. (Continued) 
Population Frequency PDF Value Population Frequency PDF Value Population Frequency PDF Value
1860 1 0.00007 1860 5 0.00033 1860 6 0.00040
1880 3 0.00020 1880 5 0.00033 1880 8 0.00053
1900 1 0.00007 1900 11 0.00073 1900 3 0.00020
1920 2 0.00013 1920 8 0.00053 1920 5 0.00033
1940 4 0.00027 1940 8 0.00053 1940 4 0.00027
1960 3 0.00020 1960 7 0.00047 1960 3 0.00020
1980 3 0.00020 1980 6 0.00040 1980 7 0.00047
2000 6 0.00040 2000 7 0.00047 2000 10 0.00067
2020 2 0.00013 2020 10 0.00067 2020 2 0.00013
2040 0 0.00000 2040 6 0.00040 2040 2 0.00013
2060 1 0.00007 2060 4 0.00027 2060 3 0.00020
2080 9 0.00060 2080 5 0.00033 2080 11 0.00073
2100 6 0.00040 2100 10 0.00067 2100 6 0.00040
2120 5 0.00033 2120 9 0.00060 2120 7 0.00047
2140 5 0.00033 2140 2 0.00013 2140 6 0.00040
2160 5 0.00033 2160 7 0.00047 2160 8 0.00053
2180 5 0.00033 2180 8 0.00053 2180 10 0.00067
2200 4 0.00027 2200 11 0.00073 2200 9 0.00060
2220 3 0.00020 2220 12 0.00080 2220 12 0.00080
2240 7 0.00047 2240 15 0.00100 2240 13 0.00087
2260 6 0.00040 2260 11 0.00073 2260 15 0.00100
2280 7 0.00047 2280 14 0.00093 2280 7 0.00047
2300 4 0.00027 2300 13 0.00087 2300 9 0.00060
2320 7 0.00047 2320 10 0.00067 2320 17 0.00113
2340 2 0.00013 2340 11 0.00073 2340 19 0.00127
2360 7 0.00047 2360 12 0.00080 2360 12 0.00080
2380 4 0.00027 2380 14 0.00093 2380 19 0.00127
2400 7 0.00047 2400 8 0.00053 2400 20 0.00133
2420 9 0.00060 2420 17 0.00113 2420 20 0.00133
2440 6 0.00040 2440 14 0.00093 2440 16 0.00107
2460 6 0.00040 2460 16 0.00107 2460 14 0.00093
2480 10 0.00067 2480 11 0.00073 2480 22 0.00147
2500 4 0.00027 2500 10 0.00067 2500 30 0.00200
2520 5 0.00033 2520 15 0.00100 2520 23 0.00153
2540 9 0.00060 2540 21 0.00140 2540 27 0.00180
2560 5 0.00033 2560 20 0.00133 2560 13 0.00087
2580 7 0.00047 2580 17 0.00113 2580 33 0.00220
2600 3 0.00020 2600 14 0.00093 2600 29 0.00193
2620 8 0.00053 2620 19 0.00127 2620 28 0.00187
2640 8 0.00053 2640 22 0.00147 2640 38 0.00253
2660 8 0.00053 2660 26 0.00173 2660 42 0.00280
2680 10 0.00067 2680 30 0.00200 2680 34 0.00227
2700 9 0.00060 2700 18 0.00120 2700 35 0.00233
excluding apartment excluding apartment and school
MC Results, 15,000 iterations MC Results, 15,000 iterations MC Results, 15,000 iterations
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Table A.1. (Continued) 
Population Frequency PDF Value Population Frequency PDF Value Population Frequency PDF Value
2720 7 0.00047 2720 33 0.00220 2720 34 0.00227
2740 8 0.00053 2740 26 0.00173 2740 38 0.00253
2760 11 0.00073 2760 31 0.00207 2760 41 0.00273
2780 8 0.00053 2780 21 0.00140 2780 49 0.00327
2800 13 0.00087 2800 24 0.00160 2800 51 0.00340
2820 5 0.00033 2820 39 0.00260 2820 43 0.00287
2840 7 0.00047 2840 36 0.00240 2840 50 0.00333
2860 14 0.00093 2860 37 0.00247 2860 53 0.00353
2880 7 0.00047 2880 38 0.00253 2880 54 0.00360
2900 13 0.00087 2900 41 0.00273 2900 52 0.00347
2920 13 0.00087 2920 43 0.00287 2920 50 0.00333
2940 13 0.00087 2940 50 0.00333 2940 67 0.00447
2960 18 0.00120 2960 45 0.00300 2960 53 0.00353
2980 10 0.00067 2980 48 0.00320 2980 78 0.00520
3000 6 0.00040 3000 51 0.00340 3000 78 0.00520
3020 14 0.00093 3020 53 0.00353 3020 72 0.00480
3040 15 0.00100 3040 67 0.00447 3040 63 0.00420
3060 15 0.00100 3060 80 0.00533 3060 84 0.00560
3080 11 0.00073 3080 67 0.00447 3080 86 0.00573
3100 12 0.00080 3100 68 0.00453 3100 82 0.00547
3120 19 0.00127 3120 86 0.00573 3120 94 0.00627
3140 24 0.00160 3140 85 0.00567 3140 101 0.00673
3160 15 0.00100 3160 79 0.00527 3160 109 0.00727
3180 20 0.00133 3180 92 0.00613 3180 118 0.00787
3200 20 0.00133 3200 92 0.00613 3200 129 0.00860
3220 23 0.00153 3220 85 0.00567 3220 132 0.00880
3240 21 0.00140 3240 78 0.00520 3240 127 0.00847
3260 12 0.00080 3260 95 0.00633 3260 123 0.00820
3280 27 0.00180 3280 88 0.00587 3280 120 0.00800
3300 17 0.00113 3300 105 0.00700 3300 156 0.01040
3320 31 0.00207 3320 92 0.00613 3320 127 0.00847
3340 26 0.00173 3340 93 0.00620 3340 158 0.01053
3360 22 0.00147 3360 89 0.00593 3360 160 0.01067
3380 30 0.00200 3380 92 0.00613 3380 143 0.00953
3400 16 0.00107 3400 83 0.00553 3400 133 0.00887
3420 22 0.00147 3420 70 0.00467 3420 171 0.01140
3440 39 0.00260 3440 107 0.00713 3440 170 0.01133
3460 28 0.00187 3460 91 0.00607 3460 176 0.01173
3480 25 0.00167 3480 61 0.00407 3480 175 0.01167
3500 33 0.00220 3500 92 0.00613 3500 166 0.01107
3520 40 0.00267 3520 94 0.00627 3520 163 0.01087
3540 46 0.00307 3540 74 0.00493 3540 172 0.01147
3560 39 0.00260 3560 85 0.00567 3560 194 0.01293
excluding apartment excluding apartment and school
MC Results, 15,000 iterations MC Results, 15,000 iterations MC Results, 15,000 iterations
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Table A.1. (Continued) 
Population Frequency PDF Value Population Frequency PDF Value Population Frequency PDF Value
3580 33 0.00220 3580 72 0.00480 3580 204 0.01360
3600 43 0.00287 3600 84 0.00560 3600 173 0.01153
3620 49 0.00327 3620 104 0.00693 3620 172 0.01147
3640 47 0.00313 3640 80 0.00533 3640 164 0.01093
3660 49 0.00327 3660 71 0.00473 3660 176 0.01173
3680 56 0.00373 3680 71 0.00473 3680 203 0.01353
3700 51 0.00340 3700 80 0.00533 3700 176 0.01173
3720 55 0.00367 3720 82 0.00547 3720 196 0.01307
3740 61 0.00407 3740 85 0.00567 3740 229 0.01527
3760 59 0.00393 3760 71 0.00473 3760 180 0.01200
3780 63 0.00420 3780 98 0.00653 3780 208 0.01387
3800 59 0.00393 3800 77 0.00513 3800 187 0.01247
3820 69 0.00460 3820 85 0.00567 3820 214 0.01427
3840 80 0.00533 3840 84 0.00560 3840 193 0.01287
3860 63 0.00420 3860 102 0.00680 3860 189 0.01260
3880 85 0.00567 3880 94 0.00627 3880 209 0.01393
3900 86 0.00573 3900 93 0.00620 3900 182 0.01213
3920 81 0.00540 3920 107 0.00713 3920 221 0.01473
3940 95 0.00633 3940 105 0.00700 3940 185 0.01233
3960 78 0.00520 3960 109 0.00727 3960 169 0.01127
3980 83 0.00553 3980 110 0.00733 3980 215 0.01433
4000 98 0.00653 4000 104 0.00693 4000 224 0.01493
4020 87 0.00580 4020 124 0.00827 4020 203 0.01353
4040 102 0.00680 4040 123 0.00820 4040 219 0.01460
4060 97 0.00647 4060 118 0.00787 4060 201 0.01340
4080 93 0.00620 4080 122 0.00813 4080 212 0.01413
4100 98 0.00653 4100 127 0.00847 4100 206 0.01373
4120 91 0.00607 4120 177 0.01180 4120 216 0.01440
4140 85 0.00567 4140 138 0.00920 4140 213 0.01420
4160 76 0.00507 4160 149 0.00993 4160 176 0.01173
4180 81 0.00540 4180 134 0.00893 4180 192 0.01280
4200 96 0.00640 4200 144 0.00960 4200 180 0.01200
4220 78 0.00520 4220 141 0.00940 4220 193 0.01287
4240 85 0.00567 4240 148 0.00987 4240 184 0.01227
4260 82 0.00547 4260 175 0.01167 4260 174 0.01160
4280 85 0.00567 4280 168 0.01120 4280 148 0.00987
4300 97 0.00647 4300 170 0.01133 4300 155 0.01033
4320 92 0.00613 4320 161 0.01073 4320 156 0.01040
4340 74 0.00493 4340 172 0.01147 4340 143 0.00953
4360 86 0.00573 4360 156 0.01040 4360 149 0.00993
4380 79 0.00527 4380 171 0.01140 4380 127 0.00847
4400 91 0.00607 4400 184 0.01227 4400 122 0.00813
4420 85 0.00567 4420 173 0.01153 4420 106 0.00707
excluding apartment excluding apartment and school
MC Results, 15,000 iterations MC Results, 15,000 iterations MC Results, 15,000 iterations
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Table A.1. (Continued) 
Population Frequency PDF Value Population Frequency PDF Value Population Frequency PDF Value
4440 97 0.00647 4440 178 0.01187 4440 123 0.00820
4460 97 0.00647 4460 171 0.01140 4460 112 0.00747
4480 94 0.00627 4480 181 0.01207 4480 101 0.00673
4500 97 0.00647 4500 173 0.01153 4500 93 0.00620
4520 94 0.00627 4520 146 0.00973 4520 84 0.00560
4540 94 0.00627 4540 173 0.01153 4540 112 0.00747
4560 108 0.00720 4560 159 0.01060 4560 85 0.00567
4580 100 0.00667 4580 154 0.01027 4580 86 0.00573
4600 120 0.00800 4600 167 0.01113 4600 67 0.00447
4620 101 0.00673 4620 155 0.01033 4620 68 0.00453
4640 107 0.00713 4640 159 0.01060 4640 67 0.00447
4660 131 0.00873 4660 154 0.01027 4660 47 0.00313
4680 134 0.00893 4680 133 0.00887 4680 54 0.00360
4700 127 0.00847 4700 140 0.00933 4700 58 0.00387
4720 131 0.00873 4720 149 0.00993 4720 41 0.00273
4740 121 0.00807 4740 134 0.00893 4740 45 0.00300
4760 139 0.00927 4760 144 0.00960 4760 47 0.00313
4780 136 0.00907 4780 149 0.00993 4780 37 0.00247
4800 140 0.00933 4800 152 0.01013 4800 35 0.00233
4820 141 0.00940 4820 133 0.00887 4820 34 0.00227
4840 125 0.00833 4840 137 0.00913 4840 39 0.00260
4860 149 0.00993 4860 129 0.00860 4860 37 0.00247
4880 130 0.00867 4880 142 0.00947 4880 32 0.00213
4900 162 0.01080 4900 122 0.00813 4900 27 0.00180
4920 140 0.00933 4920 133 0.00887 4920 24 0.00160
4940 160 0.01067 4940 137 0.00913 4940 26 0.00173
4960 166 0.01107 4960 110 0.00733 4960 22 0.00147
4980 141 0.00940 4980 114 0.00760 4980 24 0.00160
5000 156 0.01040 5000 110 0.00733 5000 18 0.00120
5020 134 0.00893 5020 116 0.00773 5020 17 0.00113
5040 157 0.01047 5040 91 0.00607 5040 15 0.00100
5060 180 0.01200 5060 91 0.00607 5060 7 0.00047
5080 162 0.01080 5080 94 0.00627 5080 13 0.00087
5100 149 0.00993 5100 72 0.00480 5100 6 0.00040
5120 167 0.01113 5120 86 0.00573 5120 15 0.00100
5140 149 0.00993 5140 91 0.00607 5140 8 0.00053
5160 155 0.01033 5160 67 0.00447 5160 3 0.00020
5180 178 0.01187 5180 82 0.00547 5180 4 0.00027
5200 168 0.01120 5200 70 0.00467 5200 4 0.00027
5220 152 0.01013 5220 71 0.00473 5220 4 0.00027
5240 154 0.01027 5240 76 0.00507 5240 3 0.00020
5260 148 0.00987 5260 63 0.00420 5260 2 0.00013
5280 155 0.01033 5280 53 0.00353 5280 0 0.00000
excluding apartment excluding apartment and school
MC Results, 15,000 iterations MC Results, 15,000 iterations MC Results, 15,000 iterations
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Table A.1. (Continued) 
Population Frequency PDF Value Population Frequency PDF Value Population Frequency PDF Value
5300 157 0.01047 5300 62 0.00413 5300 1 0.00007
5320 158 0.01053 5320 57 0.00380 5320 0 0.00000
5340 140 0.00933 5340 57 0.00380 5340 1 0.00007
5360 137 0.00913 5360 68 0.00453 5360 3 0.00020
5380 151 0.01007 5380 54 0.00360 5380 0 0.00000
5400 148 0.00987 5400 51 0.00340 5400 1 0.00007
5420 153 0.01020 5420 52 0.00347 5420 2 0.00013
5440 134 0.00893 5440 38 0.00253 5440 0 0.00000
5460 133 0.00887 5460 55 0.00367 5460 0 0.00000
5480 133 0.00887 5480 38 0.00253 5480 0 0.00000
5500 118 0.00787 5500 35 0.00233 5500 0 0.00000
5520 105 0.00700 5520 29 0.00193 5520 0 0.00000
5540 124 0.00827 5540 37 0.00247 5540 0 0.00000
5560 129 0.00860 5560 32 0.00213 5560 0 0.00000
5580 132 0.00880 5580 28 0.00187 5580 0 0.00000
5600 146 0.00973 5600 32 0.00213 5600 0 0.00000
5620 126 0.00840 5620 33 0.00220 5620 0 0.00000
5640 122 0.00813 5640 22 0.00147 5640 0 0.00000
5660 114 0.00760 5660 19 0.00127 5660 0 0.00000
5680 108 0.00720 5680 18 0.00120 5680 0 0.00000
5700 104 0.00693 5700 16 0.00107 5700 0 0.00000
5720 116 0.00773 5720 15 0.00100 5720 0 0.00000
5740 117 0.00780 5740 15 0.00100 5740 0 0.00000
5760 89 0.00593 5760 11 0.00073 5760 0 0.00000
5780 104 0.00693 5780 12 0.00080 5780 0 0.00000
5800 77 0.00513 5800 7 0.00047 5800 0 0.00000
5820 81 0.00540 5820 10 0.00067 5820 0 0.00000
5840 85 0.00567 5840 8 0.00053 5840 0 0.00000
5860 65 0.00433 5860 6 0.00040 5860 0 0.00000
5880 70 0.00467 5880 8 0.00053 5880 0 0.00000
5900 70 0.00467 5900 0 0.00000 5900 0 0.00000
5920 62 0.00413 5920 2 0.00013 5920 0 0.00000
5940 63 0.00420 5940 1 0.00007 5940 0 0.00000
5960 55 0.00367 5960 0 0.00000 5960 0 0.00000
5980 55 0.00367 5980 2 0.00013 5980 0 0.00000
6000 62 0.00413 6000 2 0.00013 6000 0 0.00000
6020 48 0.00320 6020 0 0.00000 6020 0 0.00000
6040 58 0.00387 6040 0 0.00000 6040 0 0.00000
6060 50 0.00333 6060 4 0.00027 6060 0 0.00000
6080 47 0.00313 6080 0 0.00000 6080 0 0.00000
6100 49 0.00327 6100 0 0.00000 6100 0 0.00000
6120 53 0.00353 6120 1 0.00007 6120 0 0.00000
6140 43 0.00287 6140 0 0.00000 6140 0 0.00000
excluding apartment excluding apartment and school
MC Results, 15,000 iterations MC Results, 15,000 iterations MC Results, 15,000 iterations
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Table A.1. (Continued) 
Population Frequency PDF Value Population Frequency PDF Value Population Frequency PDF Value
6160 34 0.00227 6160 0 0.00000 6160 0 0.00000
6180 39 0.00260 6180 0 0.00000 6180 0 0.00000
6200 33 0.00220 6200 0 0.00000 6200 0 0.00000
6220 37 0.00247 6220 0 0.00000 6220 0 0.00000
6240 32 0.00213 6240 0 0.00000 6240 0 0.00000
6260 41 0.00273 6260 0 0.00000 6260 0 0.00000
6280 22 0.00147 6280 0 0.00000 6280 0 0.00000
6300 26 0.00173 6300 0 0.00000 6300 0 0.00000
6320 31 0.00207 6320 0 0.00000 6320 0 0.00000
6340 25 0.00167 6340 0 0.00000 6340 0 0.00000
6360 22 0.00147 6360 0 0.00000 6360 0 0.00000
6380 25 0.00167 6380 0 0.00000 6380 0 0.00000
6400 18 0.00120 6400 0 0.00000 6400 0 0.00000
6420 19 0.00127 6420 0 0.00000 6420 0 0.00000
6440 23 0.00153 6440 0 0.00000 6440 0 0.00000
6460 18 0.00120 6460 0 0.00000 6460 0 0.00000
6480 16 0.00107 6480 0 0.00000 6480 0 0.00000
6500 13 0.00087 6500 0 0.00000 6500 0 0.00000
6520 6 0.00040 6520 0 0.00000 6520 0 0.00000
6540 7 0.00047 6540 0 0.00000 6540 0 0.00000
6560 6 0.00040 6560 0 0.00000 6560 0 0.00000
6580 2 0.00013 6580 0 0.00000 6580 0 0.00000
6600 7 0.00047 6600 0 0.00000 6600 0 0.00000
6620 4 0.00027 6620 0 0.00000 6620 0 0.00000
6640 4 0.00027 6640 0 0.00000 6640 0 0.00000
6660 2 0.00013 6660 0 0.00000 6660 0 0.00000
6680 1 0.00007 6680 0 0.00000 6680 0 0.00000
6700 1 0.00007 6700 0 0.00000 6700 0 0.00000
6720 3 0.00020 6720 0 0.00000 6720 0 0.00000
6740 0 0.00000 6740 0 0.00000 6740 0 0.00000
6760 2 0.00013 6760 0 0.00000 6760 0 0.00000
6780 0 0.00000 6780 0 0.00000 6780 0 0.00000
6800 1 0.00007 6800 0 0.00000 6800 0 0.00000
6820 2 0.00013 6820 0 0.00000 6820 0 0.00000
6840 0 0.00000 6840 0 0.00000 6840 0 0.00000
6860 0 0.00000 6860 0 0.00000 6860 0 0.00000
6880 0 0.00000 6880 0 0.00000 6880 0 0.00000
6900 0 0.00000 6900 0 0.00000 6900 0 0.00000
6920 0 0.00000 6920 0 0.00000 6920 0 0.00000
6940 0 0.00000 6940 0 0.00000 6940 0 0.00000
6960 0 0.00000 6960 0 0.00000 6960 0 0.00000
6980 1 0.00007 6980 0 0.00000 6980 0 0.00000
7000 0 0.00000 7000 0 0.00000 7000 0 0.00000
excluding apartment excluding apartment and school
MC Results, 15,000 iterations MC Results, 15,000 iterations MC Results, 15,000 iterations
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Table A.2. Monte Carlo simulation results expressed as a time series quartile chart for 
number of persons exposed above arsenic MCL (0.01 mg/L). 
 
Time
(hrs) Worst Case
95th
Percentile
75th
Percentile
Mean
Percentile
25th
Percentile
5th
Percentile Best Case
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 140 0 0 2 0 0 0
2 1384 107 2 25 0 0 0
3 2536 491 219 140 0 0 0
4 2822 772 556 305 34 0 0
5 3454 1207 787 484 83 0 0
6 3972 2112 1286 839 197 30 0
7 4601 2907 1994 1361 607 77 0
8 4623 3292 2424 1732 982 252 0
9 5008 3623 2718 2043 1351 524 0
10 5059 3693 2762 2132 1485 718 0
11 5284 3590 2696 2128 1515 812 3
12 5239 3602 2667 2131 1510 872 30
13 5484 3691 2770 2200 1556 941 13
14 5179 3866 3080 2405 1740 1047 49
15 5400 4195 3492 2702 1985 1208 58
16 5936 4508 3817 3056 2238 1429 72
17 6096 4888 4171 3349 2408 1579 209
18 6277 5151 4417 3565 2524 1667 153
19 6396 5207 4513 3617 2604 1721 238
20 6371 4886 4223 3414 2565 1654 80
21 4910 3962 3308 2783 2240 1648 422
22 4543 3555 3048 2544 2069 1436 93
23 4203 3089 2666 2291 1934 1410 121
24 4291 2982 2550 2248 1945 1497 111
25 4608 3258 2700 2402 2086 1648 222
26 4750 3637 2981 2638 2260 1810 236
27 5221 4022 3378 2926 2458 1927 173
28 5300 4317 3722 3190 2685 1997 172
29 5449 4467 3908 3334 2807 1986 36
30 5530 4450 3960 3417 2949 2056 63
31 5634 4537 3984 3448 3012 2107 200
32 5553 4460 3903 3387 2951 2080 739
33 6026 4664 3886 3357 2843 2089 397
34 5809 4704 3869 3277 2685 2000 368
35 6208 4585 3737 3151 2520 1931 348
36 6433 4540 3639 3058 2405 1862 535
37 5901 4584 3669 3057 2376 1810 323
38 6410 4719 3911 3192 2455 1807 398
39 6345 4940 4232 3408 2596 1861 413
40 6514 5198 4512 3668 2750 1940 455  
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Table A.2. (Continued) 
Time
(hrs) Worst Case
95th
Percentile
75th
Percentile
Mean
Percentile
25th
Percentile
5th
Percentile Best Case
41 6517 5482 4756 3869 2868 1943 361
42 6799 5656 4915 3995 2907 1919 321
43 6823 5643 4935 3987 2929 1925 598
44 6619 5299 4599 3740 2850 1829 338
45 5229 4312 3648 3083 2505 1817 556
46 4965 3904 3369 2820 2317 1563 271
47 4491 3401 2978 2550 2172 1505 397
48 4596 3268 2833 2484 2162 1573 321
49 4955 3476 2939 2605 2282 1722 357
50 5203 3828 3170 2804 2418 1868 394
51 5477 4213 3516 3056 2589 1967 359
52 5762 4509 3845 3294 2764 2021 278
53 5700 4632 4012 3411 2868 1963 262
54 5636 4608 4069 3480 2976 2024 216
55 5733 4659 4072 3500 3031 2057 501
56 5816 4569 3962 3434 2981 2058 603
57 5945 4720 3945 3386 2878 2062 400
58 5827 4803 3930 3317 2724 1979 304
59 6192 4714 3819 3202 2564 1895 326
60 6606 4671 3708 3114 2453 1829 316
61 6080 4695 3751 3106 2423 1781 230
62 6406 4840 3956 3227 2471 1746 229
63 6457 5086 4303 3444 2592 1758 126
64 6518 5349 4622 3710 2774 1802 182
65 6714 5625 4875 3914 2877 1800 132
66 6811 5797 5014 4030 2933 1775 152
67 6796 5748 5014 4012 2949 1792 383
68 6605 5398 4681 3769 2861 1727 207
69 5421 4391 3712 3111 2507 1720 386
70 5123 3981 3424 2849 2316 1488 233
71 4460 3509 3065 2590 2180 1420 324
72 4640 3352 2919 2514 2162 1458 305  
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APPENDIX B 
PROGRAM CODE 
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Sub Procedures 
Option Explicit 
 
Sub Simulate_Input_File() 
Dim InputFile As String, ReportFile As String, BinaryFile As String, _ 
id As String * 15, NodeID As String 
Dim TermID As String, patid As String * 15 
Dim t As Long, tstep As Long, tleft As Long, NumNodes As Long, i As Long, _ 
j As Long, TermNodes As Long, m As Long 
Dim Hydrants As Long, NumPipes As Long, Mains As Long, Svconn As Long, _ 
NumIt As Long, index As Long 
Dim ContamInit As Long, NextTimePer As Long 
Dim BDemand As Single, p As Single, d As Single, c As Single, _ 
ProgCounter As Single, InTankLevel As Single 
Dim InitQualLevel As Single, NewTankLevel As Single, NewQualLevel As Single, _ 
mean As Single, adjmultiplier As Single 
Dim ElemDemand As Single, MidDemand As Single, HSDemand As Single, _  
u As Single, patindex As Single, meanq As Single 
Dim InitQualMult As Single, TimePerMult As Single 
Dim duration As Integer, TimetoAdd As Integer 
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InputFile = "C:\temp\THE_MICROPOLIS_MODELtoxic_sourcequal.inp" 
ReportFile = "C:\temp\THEMODEL_G&BRep.txt" 
BinaryFile = "C:\temp\THEMODEL_G&BBin.txt" 
tstep = 10800 
   
Randomize 
   
NumIt = 15000 
ProgCounter = 0 
 
For j = 1 To NumIt 
'   Open toolkit 
    ENopen InputFile, ReportFile, "" 
'   Retrieve total node count 
    ENgetcount EN_NODECOUNT, NumNodes 
 
'   1) UNCERTAINITY IN DAILY DEMANDS 
    For m = 1 To NumNodes 
        ENgetnodeid m, id 
        If Left(id, 2) = "TN" Then 
            For i = 1 To 24 
                    ENgetpatternvalue m, i, mean 
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                    adjmultiplier = NormRand(mean) 
                    ENsetpatternvalue m, i, adjmultiplier 
            Next i 
        End If 
    Next m 
 
'   2) UNCERTAINTY IN INITIAL TANK LEVELS 
    InTankLevel = TankMCLognormGen() 
    'ENgetnodeindex "Tank", Index 
    ENsetnodevalue 1577, EN_TANKLEVEL, InTankLevel 
     
'   3) UNCERTAINTY IN CONTAMINANT INITIATION TIME 
'   Establish initiation time based on Beta(0.5,0.5) Distribution and A,B = 0,24 hours 
    ContamInit = BetaRand() 
 
'   4) UNCERTAINTY IN ARSENIC QUANITY OF INITIATION TIME PERIOD 
    InitQualMult = LognormRand_Quantity() 
    ENsetpatternvalue 7, ContamInit, InitQualMult 
 
'   5) UNCERTAINTY IN CONTAMINANT INTRUSION DURATION 
    duration = LognormRand_Duration() 
    TimetoAdd = duration - 1 
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    NextTimePer = ContamInit + 1 
     
        If TimetoAdd > 0 Then 
            For i = 1 To TimetoAdd 
                ' setting arsenic QUANTITY MULTIPLIER for current time period 
                TimePerMult = LognormRand_Quantity() 
                ENsetpatternvalue 7, NextTimePer, TimePerMult 
                NextTimePer = NextTimePer + 1 
            Next i 
        End If   
 
'   6) UNCERTAINTY IN SEASONAL DEMANDS 
    u = Round(Rnd(), 2) 
    If u > 0.75 Then 
        ElemDemand = 0 
        MidDemand = 0 
        HSDemand = 0 
        ENsetnodevalue 364, EN_BASEDEMAND, ElemDemand 
        ENsetnodevalue 468, EN_BASEDEMAND, MidDemand 
        ENsetnodevalue 469, EN_BASEDEMAND, HSDemand 
        Else: 
        ElemDemand = 77.77777778 
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        MidDemand = 55.55555556 
        HSDemand = 42.66666667 
        ENsetnodevalue 364, EN_BASEDEMAND, ElemDemand 
        ENsetnodevalue 468, EN_BASEDEMAND, MidDemand 
        ENsetnodevalue 469, EN_BASEDEMAND, HSDemand 
    End If 
    ENsolveH 
'   Open water quality solver 
    ENopenQ 
'   Intialize simulation and simulation clock 
    ENinitQ 1 
 
    Do 
        ENrunQ t 
'Contamination event can only occur within first 24 hours, does not repeat itself  
‘in day 2 or day 3 
        If t > 86400 Then 
            For i = 1 To 24 
                ENsetpatternvalue 7, i, 0 
            Next i 
        End If 
        If (t / 3600) - Int(t / 3600) = 0 Then 
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            Call write_time(t) 
                For i = 1 To NumNodes 
                    ENgetnodevalue i, EN_BASEDEMAND, BDemand 
                    ENgetnodevalue i, EN_QUALITY, c 
                    If BDemand > 0 And c > 0 Then 
                        ENgetnodeid i, id 
                        ENgetnodevalue i, EN_PRESSURE, p 
                        ENgetnodevalue i, EN_DEMAND, d 
                        Call write_rest(id, p, d, c) 
                    End If 
                Next i 
            Call prep 
        End If 
        ENnextQ tstep 
Loop Until t = 259200 
   Call GrabSeriesData 
Call HistPrep 
Call ClearOC 
PctDone = (ProgCounter / NumIt) 
Call UpdateProgress(PctDone) 
ProgCounter = ProgCounter + 1 
ENcloseQ 
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ENclose 
Next j 
Unload UserForm1 
End Sub 
 
Sub write_time(t As Long) 
'   This procedure gets called later to transfer data headers and the current time 
'   Transfer all headers 
    With ActiveCell 
        .Value = "Time" & Chr(10) & "(sec)" 
        .Offset(0, 1).Value = "Time" & Chr(10) & "(hrs)" 
        .Offset(0, 2).Value = "Time" & Chr(10) & "(days)" 
        .Offset(0, 3).Value = "Node ID" 
        .Offset(0, 4).Value = "Pressure" & Chr(10) & "(psi)" 
        .Offset(0, 5).Value = "Demand" & Chr(10) & "(gpm)" 
        .Offset(0, 6).Value = "Toxicity" & Chr(10) & "(mg/L)" 
        .Offset(0, 7).Value = "Pop" 
        .Offset(1, 0).Activate 
    End With 
 
'   Transfer time step 
    With ActiveCell 
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        .Value = t 
        .Offset(0, 1).Value = t / 3600 
        .Offset(0, 2).Value = t / 86400 
    End With 
    ActiveCell.Offset(0, 3).Activate 
End Sub 
 
Sub write_rest(id As String, p As Single, d As Single, c As Single) 
'   This procedure is called later to write the Node ID, pressure, and concentration for the 
current node 
'   at the current time block. 
'   Transfer argument values 
    With ActiveCell 
        .Value = id 
        .Offset(0, 1).Value = p 
        .Offset(0, 2).Value = d 
        .Offset(0, 3).Value = c 
        .Offset(0, 4).Value = Application.WorksheetFunction.VLookup(ActiveCell.Value, 
Worksheets("Lookup").Range("A1:B686"), 2) 
        .Offset(1, 0).Activate 
    End With 
End Sub 
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Sub prep() 
'   This procedure is called later to format current time block and prep the next 
Dim CurrentRow As Long, MCLPop As Long, LethPop As Long 
Dim ActiveRow As Long, ActiveCol As Long 
Dim NumberofRows As Long 
 
    ActiveCell.Offset(-1, 0).Activate 
    ActiveCell.CurrentRegion.Select 
     
    With Selection 
        .HorizontalAlignment = xlCenter 
        .VerticalAlignment = xlTop 
    End With 
     
    ActiveCell.Offset(0, 7).Activate 
    ActiveRow = ActiveCell.Row 
    ActiveCol = ActiveCell.Column 
     
    If ActiveCell.Offset(1, 0).Value = "" Then 
        With ActiveCell 
            .Offset(1, 0).Value = "none" 
            .Offset(1, -1).Value = "none" 
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            .Offset(1, -2).Value = "none" 
            .Offset(1, -3).Value = "none" 
            .Offset(1, -4).Value = "none" 
        End With 
    End If 
     
    ActiveCell.Offset(1, 1).Value = "Total Pop =" 
ActiveCell.Offset(1, 2).Value = _ 
Application.WorksheetFunction.Sum(Range(Cells(ActiveRow, ActiveCol), 
Cells(ActiveCell.End(xlDown).Row, ActiveCol))) 
    ActiveCell.Offset(2, 1).Value = "(>=0.010) =" 
    Range(Cells(ActiveRow, ActiveCol), Cells(ActiveCell.End(xlDown).Row, _ 
 ActiveCol)).Select 
    NumberofRows = Selection.Rows.Count - 1 
    ActiveCell.Offset(1, -1).Activate 
    MCLPop = 0 
    For i = 1 To NumberofRows 
        If IsNumeric(ActiveCell.Value) = True And ActiveCell.Value > 0.01 Then 
            MCLPop = MCLPop + ActiveCell.Offset(0, 1).Value 
        End If 
        ActiveCell.Offset(1, 0).Activate 
    Next i 
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    ActiveCell.Offset(-1, 0).Activate 
    ActiveCell.End(xlUp).Activate 
    ActiveCell.Offset(2, 3).Value = MCLPop 
    ActiveCell.Offset(3, 2).Value = "(>=5) =" 
    ActiveCell.Offset(1, 0).Activate 
    LethPop = 0 
    For i = 1 To NumberofRows 
        If IsNumeric(ActiveCell.Value) = True And ActiveCell.Value > 5 Then 
            LethPop = LethPop + ActiveCell.Offset(0, 1).Value 
        End If 
        ActiveCell.Offset(1, 0).Activate 
    Next i 
    ActiveCell.Offset(-1, 0).Activate 
    ActiveCell.End(xlUp).Activate 
    ActiveCell.Offset(3, 3).Value = LethPop    
    Range(Cells(ActiveRow, ActiveCol), Cells(ActiveCell.End(xlDown).Row, _  
 ActiveCol)).Select 
    If Selection.Rows.Count < 4 Then 
        ActiveCell.Offset(7, -7).Activate 
        Else: ActiveCell.End(xlDown).Offset(4, -7).Activate 
    End If 
End Sub 
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Sub UpdateProgress(Pct) 
'   This procedure is for the progress bar that gets displayed 
    With UserForm1 
        .FrameProgress.Caption = Format(Pct, "0%") 
        .LabelProgress.Width = Pct * (.FrameProgress.Width - 10) 
        .Repaint 
    End With 
End Sub 
 
Sub ShowDialog() 
'   This procedure initiates the progress bar 
    Worksheets("Output").Activate 
    ActiveWindow.WindowState = xlMinimized 
    Range("A1").Activate 
    UserForm1.LabelProgress.Width = 0 
    UserForm1.Show 
    ActiveWindow.WindowState = xlMaximized 
End Sub 
 
Sub GrabSeriesData() 
'   This procedure gets called later. 
'   Part 1 of 2 used to help write the output for number exposed used to create histogram 
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Dim timex As Long, popul As Long, Mpop As Long, Lpop As Long 
 
    Worksheets("Output").Activate 
    Range("B2").Activate 
    Do 
        timex = ActiveCell.Value 
        popul = ActiveCell.Offset(0, 8).Value 
        Mpop = ActiveCell.Offset(1, 8).Value 
        Lpop = ActiveCell.Offset(2, 8).Value 
         
        Call NextRowPro(timex, popul, Mpop, Lpop) 
         
        Worksheets("Output").Activate 
        ActiveCell.End(xlDown).Activate 
        ActiveCell.Offset(1, 0).Activate 
    Loop Until ActiveCell.Value = 72 
    timex = ActiveCell.Value 
    popul = ActiveCell.Offset(0, 8).Value 
    Mpop = ActiveCell.Offset(1, 8).Value 
    Lpop = ActiveCell.Offset(2, 8).Value 
    Call NextRowPro(timex, popul, Mpop, Lpop) 
End Sub 
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Sub NextRowPro(timex As Long, popul As Long, Mpop As Long, Lpop As Long) 
'   This procedure gets called later. 
'   It is part 2 of 2 used to help write the output for number exposed used to create a 
histogram 
Dim NextRow As Long 
 
    Worksheets("Chart").Activate 
    Range("A1").Value = "Time" 
    Range("B1").Value = "Pop" 
    Range("C1").Value = "(>=0.010)" 
    Range("D1").Value = "(>=5)" 
    NextRow = Application.WorksheetFunction.CountA(Range("A:A")) + 1 
    Cells(NextRow, 1).Activate 
    ActiveCell.Value = timex 
    ActiveCell.Offset(0, 1).Value = popul 
    ActiveCell.Offset(0, 2).Value = Mpop 
    ActiveCell.Offset(0, 3).Value = Lpop 
End Sub 
 
Sub HistPrep() 
'   This procedure gets called later. 
'   It is used to help write the input range needed to create the histogram. 
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Dim MCLexp As Single, Letexp As Single, NextRecord As Single 
     
    MCLexp = Application.WorksheetFunction.Max(Range("C2:C74")) 
    Letexp = Application.WorksheetFunction.Max(Range("D2:D74")) 
     
    Worksheets("Hist").Activate 
    NextRecord = Application.WorksheetFunction.CountA(Range("B:B")) + 1 
    Cells(NextRecord, 2).Value = MCLexp 
    Cells(NextRecord, 4).Value = Letexp 
End Sub 
 
Sub ClearOC() 
'   This procedure gets called later to clear the "Output" and "Chart" worksheets 
'   for next iteration. 
    Worksheets("Output").Activate 
    Worksheets("Output").Cells.Select 
    Selection.ClearContents 
    Worksheets("Output").Range("A1").Select 
    Worksheets("Chart").Activate 
    Worksheets("Chart").Cells.Select 
    Selection.ClearContents 
    Worksheets("Chart").Range("A1").Select 
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    Worksheets("Output").Activate 
    Range("A1").Activate 
End Sub 
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Function Procedures 
Option Explicit 
 
Function NormRand(mean As Single) As Single 
'   Used for daily demands  
Dim Value1 As Single, Value2 As Single, Fac As Single, Rsq As Single, stdev _ 
 As Single 
    Randomize 
    Do 
        Value1 = 2 * Rnd - 1 
        Value2 = 2 * Rnd - 1 
        Rsq = Value1 ^ 2 + Value2 ^ 2 
    Loop Until Rsq > 0 And Rsq < 1 
    Fac = (-2 * Log(Rsq) / Rsq) ^ 0.5 
    stdev = 0.25 * mean 
    If Rnd < 0.5 Then 
        NormRand = (Value1 * Fac) * stdev + mean 
    Else 
        NormRand = (Value2 * Fac) * stdev + mean 
    End If     
End Function 
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Function TankMCLognormGen() As Single 
'   Used for Initial Tank Level 
        'TankMCLognormGen = Exp(WhiteNoise * stdev(ln(x)) + mean(ln(x))) 
        TankMCLognormGen = Exp((WhiteNoise * 0.016) + 4.693) 
        TankMCLognormGen = Round(TankMCLognormGen, 2) 
End Function 
 
Function BetaRand() As Double 
'   Used for Initiation Time.  Generates a Beta distribution random number with  
‘  parameters alpha, beta, A, and B. 
    Do 
        BetaRand = Round(WorksheetFunction.BetaInv(alea(), 0.5, 0.5, 0, 25), 0) 
    Loop Until BetaRand <> 0 And BetaRand <> 25 
End Function 
 
Function LognormRand_Quantity() As Single 
'   Used for Arsenic Quantity 
Dim Value1 As Single, Value2 As Single, Fac As Single, Rsq As Single, stdev As 
Single 
    Randomize 
    Do 
        Value1 = 2 * Rnd - 1 
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        Value2 = 2 * Rnd - 1 
        Rsq = Value1 ^ 2 + Value2 ^ 2 
    Loop Until Rsq > 0 And Rsq < 1 
    Fac = (-2 * Log(Rsq) / Rsq) ^ 0.5 
        mean = -0.16841 
    stdev = 0.6417 
    If Rnd < 0.5 Then 
        LognormRand_Quantity = Exp((Value1 * Fac) * stdev + mean) 
    Else 
        LognormRand_Quantity = Exp((Value2 * Fac) * stdev + mean) 
    End If 
End Function 
 
Function LognormRand_Duration() As Double 
'   Used for contamination duration 
        'ActiveCell(i) = Exp(WhiteNoise * stdev(ln(x)) + mean(ln(x))) 
        LognormRand_Duration = Round(Exp((WhiteNoise * 0.392) + 0.672), 0) 
        If LognormRand_Duration < 1 Then 
            LognormRand_Duration = 0 
        End If 
End Function 
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Function WhiteNoise() As Single 
'   Written by Kelly Brumbelow, Dept. of Civil Engineering, Texas A&M University. 
'   Returns a normally distributed random variant with mean 0 and variance 1. 
Dim Value1 As Single, Value2 As Single, Fac As Single, Rsq As Single 
    Randomize 
    Do 
        Value1 = 2 * Rnd - 1 
        Value2 = 2 * Rnd - 1 
        Rsq = Value1 ^ 2 + Value2 ^ 2 
    Loop Until Rsq > 0 And Rsq < 1 
    Fac = (-2 * Log(Rsq) / Rsq) ^ 0.5 
    If Rnd < 0.5 Then 
        WhiteNoise = Value1 * Fac 
    Else 
        WhiteNoise = Value2 * Fac 
    End If 
End Function 
 
Function alea() 
'   This function is used to simulate uniformly distributed random variables [0 1]  
‘   excluding ‘ 0 and 1. 
Randomize 
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    alea = Rnd() 
    If alea = 1 Then 
        alea = 0.999999999999 
    End If 
    If alea = 0 Then 
        alea = 1 - 0.999999999999 
    End If 
End Function 
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